Largest grotto cemetery in caves Vietnam

Discovering ‘coffin museum’

July 25, 2011  about News, Travel

LookAtVietnam - Po Cung Grotto on Pha Hang Mountain in Thanh Hoa province is the largest grotto cemetery in Vietnam.

The grotto is 10m high, divided into three parts with two doors of 5m high. It is the cemetery for 74 ancient coffins made of tree-trunks. Most of them are quite intact.

Anthropologists explained that instead of burying dead people, some ethnic groups put dead people in caves. In Vietnam, this practice was popular during the Dong Son era.

Archaeologists discovered coffins dating back to the first century in Thailand caves and coffins from the 5th century BCE to the early 20th century in China’s caves. Coffins in the form of dug-out canoes in Po Cung grotto are the first of their kind to be discovered in Vietnam. These coffins are made of tree-trunks and they are placed on wooden brackets.  

The biggest coffins are 2.8m long, 0.48m wide and the smallest are 1.4m long and 0.28m wide. Many coffins don’t have bones inside.

Scientists observed that this grotto may be a cemetery of several big families and they still want to know how they brought the coffins into the grotto, which is located high on the mountain.

After Po Cung grotto was discovered several years ago in Quan Hoa district, officials have combined with the Institute for Archaeology to research the grotto. The provincial government aims to turn it into a tourist site.

Discovering Po Cung Cave with VietNamNet:

On the way to Po Cung cave.

The red cross sign is the cave

Archaeologists left signs on the road.

The cave door.

Broken coffins.

Hoang Giang

Hanoi Photo exhibition of the World's Most Beautiful geological images

 

 
A photo from the first prize winner Hoang Trung Thuy’s photo album “Vietnamese Stones – Seas”, showcased at Pham Ngu Lao Guest House, 33 Pham Ngu Lao St., Hanoi

Some of the world’s most beautiful geological images are currently on display at the Dialogue on Geoheritage photo exhibition in Hanoi.

After a run at the Hanoi Opera House, the show at the Pham Ngu Lao Guest House through July 23 features 56 individual photographs and three photo albums chosen from a photo contest held in May.

The photo show comes as part of the 2nd International Asia-Pacific Geoparks Network, a conference on in Hanoi through July 24 in which countries with UNESCO-recognized geoparks are meeting to discuss the preservation of natural landscapes.

UNESCO recognizes a geopark as a “territory encompassing one or more sites of scientific importance, not only for geological reasons but also by virtue of its archaeological, ecological or cultural value,” according to the UNESCO website.

The global body’s official geopark program seeks to conserve the planet’s geological heritage while encouraging sustainable research and development by the concerned communities.

The photos on show in Hanoi, selected from 2,219 works by 179 artists nationwide, were meant to capture the concept of geological heritage through images. They feature landscapes in Vietnam, including the famous red and yellow sand-dune beaches in the central coastal province of Binh Thuan, Ban Gioc Waterfall in the northern province of Cao Bang, and Ma Pi Leng Mountain and the famous stone fences of the northernmost mountainous province of Ha Giang.

The first prize was awarded to the photo album ‘Vietnamese Stones – Seas’ by Hoang Trung Thuy, second prize was taken by ‘Lithophone’ by Vo Ngoc Lan and ‘Ly Son fairy island’ (Quang Ngai Province) by Nguyen Xuan Vinh.

Third prizes went to ‘Son Tra Cave’ (in Da Nang) by Truong Minh Dien, ‘A new day on top of Fansipan’ (Lao Cai Province) by Bui Quoc Ky and ‘Dragon down’ (Quang Ninh Province) by Do Khanh Giang.

The Dong Van Karst Stone Plateau in Ha Giang Province is the first official UNESCO global Geopark in Vietnam and the second in Southeast Asia.

Thanh Nien News 

China’s game in the East Sea

July 21, 2011  about Uncategorized

LookAtVietnam - The following analysis by Dr. Le Hong Nhat, from the HCM City National University, is a profound angle of the nature of the East Sea disputes, China’s plot and recommendations of policies for Vietnam. The articles show the author’s personal viewpoint

China’s game in the East Sea

As being analyzed in the first part (), China’s major goal is to control the international sea lane from the Middle East to the Malacca Strait, through the East Sea to Truong Sa Archipelago (Spratly Islands) and to Hoang Sa Archipelago (Paracel Islands) (See Map 1).

This sea route is vital for China but it is also vital for the US, Japan and countries in the region. Cooperation in international maritime security between China and the US, Japan, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) will be ideal for the stability and prosperity of the region. But turning these international waters into China’s territorial waters is more firmly a guarantee for China’s security, with the sovereignty of smaller countries in the region being violated.

We are witnessing a process in which China is seeking to harass smaller countries in order to re-map the region. Harassment or bilateral disputes related to island and sea sovereignty, the right to explore oil and gas, and to catch fish in the East Sea  are the first steps in the great plot to control the strategic sea lanes through the East Sea.

To avoid a conflict on freedom of navigation in the future, Vietnam must understand the gain and loss of each party in the game that China is playing. What does China want from that game? Why these are short-term steps for acquiring China’s long-term goal? Answering these questions will help find out mechanisms to promote regional security through peaceful negotiation.

Let’s review the Binh Minh 02 and Viking 2 cases, in which Chinese ships cut cables of Vietnamese seismic survey ships, or China’s construction of iron pillars and release of floats in Amy Douglas bank or Chinese ship’s harassment of Vietnamese and Filipino fishing boats in the waters of Vietnam and the Philippines.

Facing China’s provoking acts, Vietnam and the Philippines have four main choices: Firstly, making no response; secondly, issuing diplomatic notes protesting China’s acts at bilateral or multilateral forums, for example the United Nations; thirdly, bringing the cases to the international court; fourthly, implementing appropriate self-defense actions, like the Philippines pulled up China’s iron poles, or seized Chinese fishing boats that broke into its exclusive economic zone and judge them under the law.

If the incidents are bilateral conflicts, issuing diplomatic notes to protest China’s provoking acts is likely doing nothing. Bringing the incidents to the international court is time-consuming, costly and it may makes the cases more complicated since the international law is not specific enough to judge such cases. In addition, once a series of incidents happen continuously, the complicacy of the cases would rise and this would only benefit the bigger, which uses its soft power to bully the smaller.

On China’s viewpoint, making provoking acts related to the right to catch fish or exploring oil and gas in the exclusive economic zones of smaller countries in the East Sea will benefit for itself as follows:

1) China can keep conflicts at a sufficiently mild level to make it as “bilateral conflicts”, in which smaller countries can hardly do anything to change the situation.

2) The series of conflicts must be unceasingly and happen throughout strategic points in the East Sea, in order to turn fait accomplishments into China’s actual control in the East Sea.

More clearly, the Philippines’ driving away Chinese fishing ships or pulling up poles at the Amy Douglas bank could create opportunity for China to “accuse” the Philippines in the media (which makes China’s voice powerful thanks to money and soft power), and that the Philippines would have to suffer from China’s “executive” activities.

With China’s outstanding and rising military strength, smaller countries in the region have to face the risk that they would have to suffer great losses if they dare to resist China’s “executive” acts alone. Seeing that final outcome, smaller countries may have to take no action, except for releasing diplomatic notes to protest China’s acts, which is useless as the above analysis.

For that logic, Vietnam did not react when China imposed ban of fishing in a vast area of the East Sea, including Vietnam’s continental shelf for a long time. Resignation will gradually become the compulsory acceptance of China’s actual control in the East Sea. At that time, international conventions on the sea, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), will be useless to change the fact: China’s U-shaped line has been gradually set up in fact. It means that the strategic maritime lane through the East Sea will gradually belong to China. Other countries will have to obey the unirule, which is enforced by China’s military power and is anticipated to challenge the US in western Pacific by 2030.

China’s blocking strategy

Vietnam’s Viking II ship.

China’s blocking strategy to swallow the East Sea can be briefed as follows:

After China creates incidents in the East Sea, which violate the rights to catch fish and explore oil of Vietnam and the Philippines, for instance the Binh Minh 02 and Viking 2 incidents, if Vietnam and the Philippines will make no response, China will win a point in its plot to occupy the East Sea. In that circumstance, Vietnam/the Philippines will lose part of their rights to explore natural resources in their territorial waters, including the islands and the waters where their people have been living.

Another choice, instead of making no reaction, Vietnam/the Philippines can have self-defense actions that are appropriate to regional commitments and international conventions. But after facing Vietnam/the Philippines’s self-defense reaction, China can response by two ways: Firstly, observing its commitments to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC) and the UNCLOS. Thus, parties reach conciliation after conflicts. China does not score any point in its plot to seize the East Sea (scoring zero mark) while Vietnam/the Philippines do not lose any point in sovereignty.

On the contrary, China may break it words in respecting regional agreements and the international law. Specifically, China can make up the incidents to turn itself into the victim and it must to take “executive” actions. By doing so, China continuously violates the international law and the sovereignty of smaller countries. With the imbalance in terms of economic and military strength, the winner in bilateral conflicts will be the stronger, regardless of justice. Specifically, China scores two points in the plot to occupy the East Sea while Vietnam/the Philippines lose two points in defending their sovereignty.

If Vietnam/the Philippines make self-defense actions unilaterally, China’s swallowing of the East Sea will take place faster. China will absolutely retract its words and trample on the DOC and the UNCLOS. China will double the speed of swallowing the East Sea if it breaks its commitments. Seeing that ultimate result, Vietnam/the Philippines are not allowed to expect that China will implement its commitments.

Certainly, China and Vietnam/the Philippines can sign an agreement which is more binding than the DOC. Accordingly, Vietnam/the Philippines can sue China to the international law if China re-breaks the newly-signed convention. However, such legal agreements cannot count on all possible conflicts in the future. China can take advantage of the circumstances that are not made clear in such an agreement as the gap to continue blocking Vietnam/the Philippines, regardless of the new agreement.

On the other hand, reaching such a legal-binding agreement will increase the morals and legitimacy in sovereignty of Vietnam/the Philippines over their islands and waters. It will be the ground for setting up strategic cooperation ties in the region and in the world to defend Vietnam/the Philippines’ legitimate sovereignty. If the Malacca Strait is taken into account, which is the next target in China’s strategy to control the international sea lane, a non-official alliance including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam will be formed.

That game is multilateral in nature and it must be solved multilaterally. At this point, China’s blocking in bilateral ties is more brutal, its acts are more contrary to morals and posing more dangerous precedents to freedom and security of international navigation.

On the view, China’s bilateral blocking to seize the East Sea will face stronger protest of the international community and it is difficult for China to realize its plot.

Dr. Le Hong Nhat

Beijing's Dilemma

Diplomacy vs oil: Beijing”s dilemma

July 10, 2011  about News, Politics

LookAtVietnam - China’s recent disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines over oil exploration in the East Sea are challenging its own diplomatic strategy of maintaining a low profile on the international stage.

The Chinese government still hopes to “play it safe” while tackling international disputes, a diplomat in Beijing told Want Daily. However, pressure from various interest groups in the country such as petroleum companies is posing a dilemma for senior Chinese officials, who are caught between diplomatic interests and energy interests, the diplomat added.

Given the diplomatic setbacks faced by China in 2010, when it was involved in territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and India, this year China’s diplomatic strategy is focused on befriending its neighbors, as well as the United States.

This much can be seen from Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States at the beginning of the year, and Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s trip to Japan after the March 11 earthquake.

However, the diplomat added, while China favors restraint in its interactions with other countries, several domestic interest groups are pressuring the government to act otherwise.

For example, he said, oil companies are urging the government to launch large-scale oil explorations in the South China Sea (East Sea) on the pretext that unrest in North Africa and the Middle East could affect oil supplies this year.

China recently completed an exploration of the physical environment of the East Sea, gaining in-depth understanding of the oil and mineral resources in the area, noted the diplomat, adding that the country’s deep-sea oil technology had achieved several breakthroughs this year.

The diplomat believed that these factors could place more pressure on the Philippines and Vietnam and intensify the sovereignty disputes in the maritime region.

China is expected to begin operations in the East Sea from August, Mi Lijun, the chief inspector of China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s exploration department, said in June.

Source: wantchinatimes

Guinness book of records/Giant Vietnam book

Giant book sets Vietnam record

July 8, 2011  about Uncategorized

LookAtVietnam - Vietnam’s Guinness book of records has recognized a book
titled “Legend of Quang Tri Ancient Citadel” that includes the names of more
than 4,000 martyrs as the country’s largest book.

The giant book is 1m x 0.7m and was completed in two years by the Center of
Information and Communication for Environmental Development, the People’s Army
Publishing House and the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS).

For the first time, a book has listed more than 4,000 names of martyrs who laid
down their lives in destroying U.S bomb strikes during 81 days and nights in the
summer of 1972 in Quang Tri Province.

The book has four parts and includes landscape and historical events of Quang
Tri, the destruction of U.S bombs in the summer of 1972, poems and songs
honoring jthe Quang Tri Ancient Citadel and soldiers in wartime.

A total of 10,000 copies of the book have been given to martyrs’ families and
soldiers. The book will be on display at the Quang Tri ancient citadel Museum.

The book is the seventh work in a collection called “Legend of Vietnam” which
includes Legend of Dien Bien, Legend of Con Dao, Legend of Truong Son, Legend of
volunteer youth, Legend of U Minh, and Legend of Phu Quoc.

The giant book will be publicly displayed in a parade on July 8 in Hanoi before
arriving in Quang Tri.

Source: TTXVN/SGGP

Lethal Injection plan delayed in Vietnam

Vietnam delays lethal injection plan

July 6, 2011  about News, Politics

VietNamNet Bridge – Vietnam was supposed to execute the condemned by lethal injection as of July 1 instead of the firing squad but the plan has been delayed, probably until September.

A bed specially designed for execution by lethal injection in the US. (Photo: Dan Tri)

The switch to lethal injection was passed by the legislature National Assembly last year but Ministry of Public Security has proposed a delay until September 1 for some preparations.

The ministry has submitted the postponement plan to the National Assembly’s Justice Committee, blaming it on “unavailable conditions” for the injections.

According to Le Thi Nga, deputy chairperson of the Committee, facilities for lethal injection need to be set up and executioners also need to be trained in the new method.

Relevant agencies are also stepping up the completion of a decree to guide the implementation of the Law, the official said.

Under the Law on Execution of Criminal Verdicts that took effect from July 1, Vietnam will carry out the death penalty using lethal injection.

The Committee urged the ministry to step up its preparations so that lethal injection can be applied as soon as possible.

The ministry has submitted a plan to build lethal injection facilities to the Prime Minister for approval.

Due to the delay, the schedule for execution will also be postponed until September, Nga said.

VietNamNet/Tuoi Tre

Why sweat about China?

Why not to sweat about China

July 2, 2011  about News, Politics

LookAtVietnam - Its current row with two Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea (East Sea) has alarmed many observers. But a similar spat with Japan shows that conflict isn’t inevitable.

The past year has been a difficult one for the coastal states of the East Sea and there are number of indications that China’s decade long restraint is at an end. In 2010, rumours abounded that Beijing considered the East Sea  a ‘core interest,’ and China symbolically planted a flag on the seafloor. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s hysterical response to US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s restatement of US policy towards the dispute, meanwhile, seemed to be overkill.

The first half of 2011 has been similar. Chinese vessels, both civilian and government, have interfered with Philippine and Vietnamese survey activities in disputed waters, and Chinese vessels continue to fire at rival fishermen. This behaviour seems to confirm long-held suspicions about China’s posture towards the East Sea; that as soon as China developed the military capability to dominate the East Sea, it would. Now, following the latest developments, conflict in the East Sea seems imminent.

However, we’ve seen this Chinese behavior before, in the East China Sea, where China and Japan dispute the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the sea waters that surround them. Importantly, the escalation of tension in that dispute resulted in cooperation, not conflict. The dispute over energy resources began in earnest in 2004 after Japan discovered a Chinese drilling platform at the Chunxiao gas field, within 200 nautical miles of Japan’s coast, but just outside the median line that marked the limit of Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone claim in its domestic law.

When it became apparent that commercially viable resources existed at Chunxiao, Tokyo insisted Beijing cease operations and jointly develop the field with Japan. To ascertain the extent of the undersea resources, Tokyo commissioned the Norwegian flagged Ram-form Victory to conduct a thorough survey of the median line area near the Chunxiao field. During this survey, the Ram-form Victory was stalked on several occasions by Chinese naval vessels and confronted on one occasion by a military vessel disguised as a research ship.

Furthermore, in September 2005 a highly advanced Sovereignty destroyer targeted a P3-C Orion patrol plane that passed over the Chunxiao field. As a consequence of these events, Japan galvanized its efforts to access resources in the East China Sea. Aerial patrols of the area increased and Tokyo backed away from its median line claim in favour of a full 200 nautical miles, awarded concession blocks adjacent to the median line to Teikoku Oil, and set about passing the laws required to protect Japanese oil companies working in the East China Sea.

Predictably, this resulted in histrionics from Beijing. Somewhat surprising however, was that as Japan set about preparing to drill for gas in the disputed area, negotiations between the two began to bear fruit. After the Diet passed the Law on Establishing Safety Areas for Maritime Structures in April 2007 – which permitted Japan to outline safety zones around drilling installations and tasked the coast guard with expelling vessels that violated these zones – negotiations occurred more frequently and yielded tangible results. Finally, in June 2008 the two sides announced a joint development arrangement that spelled out the sharing of resources at Chunxiao and outlined a joint development zone to the north that straddled the median line.

Of course, the agreement isn’t perfect. It hasn’t yet been implemented due to domestic political opposition in China, and Japan’s reluctance to surrender claims to ownership of the Chunxiao field. Maritime tensions also persist. Japan’s coast guard research vessel, the Shoyo was confronted twice by Chinese vessels in 2010, the latter incident coinciding with the collision of a Chinese fishing boat with a Japanese coast guard vessel. However, this shouldn’t detract from the lesson learned. States bargain over disputed maritime space as they would any other issue in international politics. States will posture, threaten and engage in low level demonstrations of military force to reinforce their claim and improve their lot. While dangerous, this behavior doesn’t mean that conflict is inevitable, nor does it prevent bilateral talks at the bureaucratic and official levels.

While some argue that resources drive maritime disputes, there’s little evidence to support the view that there is sufficient oil and gas in the East Sea to warrant a resource war. More likely, claimant states recognize that unilateral resource development by a rival state is damaging to their claim to the disputed area, not because it ‘steals’ resources, but because by ignoring such activity states could be accused of surrendering their claim to the area.

In fact, one could argue that it was the discovery of commercially viable resources in the East China Sea that led to the June 2008 consensus between China and Japan in the first place. So, too it will be in the East Sea, once the bargaining and posturing has finished. If China’s resource needs are as dire as some suggest, Beijing may in fact be pushing for cooperative development of offshore resources, rather than trying to stop production entirely.

The comparison does, however, raise some interesting questions about China’s relations with its neighbours. Why have Chinese vessels (allegedly) cut the sonar cables of Philippine and Vietnamese vessels while Japanese survey vessels have been left unharmed? Is it because recent Japanese surveys, have been conducted by government vessels, rather than civilian ones? Is it because Japan is a US military ally of the first order? In either case, this difference may support calls in Vietnam and the Philippines for the development of stronger survey capabilities, stronger naval capabilities and above all to seek closer defence ties with the United States. However, these too are bargaining tools. When Japan strengthened its position, China moved to cooperate, albeit in a limited form. The same may soon occur in the East Sea.

James Manicom (The Diplomat)

(The author is a visiting researcher at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and a SSHRC postdoctoral fellow in the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada.)

Vietnamese raise flag on Top of Indochina's tallest peak

On the roof of Indochina 

July 3, 2011  about Travel

Waving the Vietnamese flag on the top of Indochina’s tallest peak.

Since my student days, I’d cherished a dream of climbing the 3,143 meters Mount Fansipan in Lao Cai in Vietnam’s far northwest. Yet it took me several years to muster the courage and build up the confidence I would need to tackle Indochina’s tallest peak.

Leaving Hanoi on a hot summer’s day, I caught a train to Lao Cai. From there it was nearly one hour by bus to Sapa, where I arrived at seven o’clock on a typically cold and misty morning. By nine I’d reached Tram Ton, eager and determined to conquer Fansipan, whose name means “precarious giant rock” in the local language.

With only two days to climb the mountain, we’d opted for the easiest route, departing from Tram Ton at an altitude of 1,900 meters above sea level. We ignored the inviting calls of a more treacherous route starting from Cat Cat at an altitude of 1,245 meters with plenty of leeches and a quite different route from Sin Chao at an altitude of 1,260, meters, where most sections of the road run along the top of sheer cliffs.

Though reckoned to be the easiest way, the journey from Tram Ton made office workers like me pant and tremble in fear from the start of the road that took more than a dozen kilometers to climb over 1,200 meters in altitude.

There were 16 of us in the group along with seven native porters and a tour guide. Despite carrying heavy rucksacks on their backs, the porters kept running up the steep mountainside. Our guide Tinh said that sometimes there would be 400 people in the tour party, too many for the number of tents to go around. On those occasions the porters rolled out large canvas groundsheets in the open for the trekkers to lie and sleep on.

Tough going

The first day of climbing was the harder and more challenging, especially the first 500 meters as our unaccustomed hands and feet had great difficulty climbing on and clinging to uneven, slippery rocks that made some people give up, though not for a lack of trying.

It was drizzling and freezing cold at Sapa, so we felt fortunate when the air got warmer and drier as we proceeded into the forest, and by noon the sun was shining. Having hidden itself in the morning mist, the Hoang Lien Forest began to appear and show its fantastic features like the typically northwestern plants and flowers. In the Hoang Lien Son Range alone there are more than 30 species of azalea native to these mountains. Indeed, the azaleas and their stunning display are a major part of what draws tourists to the region.

After half a day, we reached the first stop of the ascent at an altitude of 2,200 meters. Panting and almost out of breath, it was no comfort to us when the guide said it was the easiest part of the journey. A few years ago, that stop was simply a place to put up a tent, have lunch and rest awhile. Not so nowadays, not with all the H’mong women and girls, their cheeks rosy from the cold and dry air of the mountains, selling soft drink to the growing hordes of visitors.

Onwards to the summit

The porters are paid VND120,000 (US$6) per day but they have to help the amateur climbers in many ways. Usually there is one porter for every two or three paying tourists. In some villages, more than half of the inhabitants work as porters, and even women do it too. The season for climbing Mount Fansipan lasts from February until the end of summer.

A noticeable feature of the route is the dense bamboo stretching for miles. Until a few years back, many climbers would get lost in the bamboo as it was too thick and tall to get one’s bearings. Because of the increased traffic along the route, a path has been worn that is easy to follow so it is much harder to stray these days.

As we emerged from the first bamboo forest, we saw our destination in the failing light. We were worn out, and moving our legs was a real challenge.

It was much colder at night than during the day on the Hoang Lien Son Range. I wore warm clothes and crawled into a sleeping bag but I still shivered with cold while the wind gusted outside. Our porters, who doubled as our cooks, collected dead sticks to use as firewood. Around 11 o’clock, I felt thirsty and left the tent for a drink. Frost was building up and I saw the porters huddling around their campfires to keep warm.

I felt sore all over the many times I awoke from a fitful sleep, and thought of giving up the remaining part, but when morning came I was raring to go again. As we journeyed upward, we passed through more bamboo shrouded in early morning mist and tackled some formidable terrain that took all the porters’ encouragement and support to get us through. 

The higher we climbed, the more difficult it was, but the forest and views were even more stunning and distracted us somewhat from our travail.

Eventually we surmounted yet another steep slope that opened onto a level area with a panoramic view and somebody yelled “we’ve made it to the top”, much to our surprise. It was just a rock, but it jutted out proudly and proclaimed itself the summit of Fansipan, higher than anything else. One by one we touched it and yelled and waved the Vietnamese flag in delight. We were so excited to be there. And we were sure to get our pictures taken as mementos of the effort and victory over ourselves.

Reported by Mai Ha